r e s e a r c h e r.

The UK Joint Committee National Security published a call for evidence on how ‘red-teaming’ might be introduced into national security decision-making. We proposed a Hybrid Hackathon Delphi Model (HHDM) as a continuous cycle of inquiry in emerging technology with supporting evidence, using ingestible medical devices as an example technology.

We contributed to a new report by the UK Lords’ and Commons’ Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) that presented findings of an inquiry about the ability of the National Security Council – a Cabinet committee of senior ministers - to make and implement strategy, manage risk and plan for crises with rigour. The report described the government’s structures and processes for national security as inadequate.

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK Joint Committee National Biosecurity published a call for evidence on the main drivers of biosecurity risks to human health in the UK, including pandemics. Through a systematic review and Delphi study we conducted between 2019-20 at the University College London, we proposed three key recommendations, including adopting an experimental approach.

We contributed to the UK’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy published report “Biosecurity and national security”. The report assesses how prepared the Government is for major biological security risks, using the covid-19 pandemic as a test case — to consider whether and how the identification of risk in our National Security system provokes a proportionate response, in terms of means to address that risk.

Biosecurity is essential for safeguarding biological materials and technologies, but traditional approaches often lack the excitement and engagement needed for widespread adoption. This question seeks to explore innovative strategies that go beyond conventional methods, incorporating interdisciplinary collaboration, creative activism, and ground-breaking design to spark biosecurity socialization.

This article is part of a series of papers from the UCL Jill Dando Institute focused on the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for police agencies and other organisations with an interest in the topic. In this article , I discuss the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on the growing problem of bio-crime both in the UK and abroad.

Synthetic biology has the potential to positively transform society in many application areas, including medicine. In common with all revolutionary new technologies, synthetic biology can also enable crime. Here, we systematically reviewed forms of crime that could be facilitated by synthetic biology with a view to informing their prevention. More effective engagement, such as ethical hacking, is needed now to prevent a crime harvest from developing in the future. A framework to address the synthetic biology crime landscape is proposed.

Forecasting crime trends remains a challenge and current evidence is fragmented. The discussion of security implications is dispersed across disciplines and there has been no collation and assessment of the previous literature. This causes a difficulty in understanding what proportion of the known synthetic biology offending problem requires prioritization. Here, a protocol is developed to systematically synthesize empirical evidence from peer-reviewed primary data from a range of disciplines, including Life science, Computer Science, and Criminology.

Hidden populations research presents logistical challenges yet remains critical to futures studies. The biohacking community is an under-researched catalyst for innovation and social change. Early-career researchers experience a steep learning curve during data collection or fieldwork. Challenges include establishing trust with participants and navigating ethical processes. Overcoming these challenges allows researchers to expand their research further.

Security discussions are limited to siloed expertise from traditional professions and there has been no engagement with diverse communities. The scale of identified and predicted biocrime is unknown and is expected to be more sophisticated in the future. Here, we elicit potential threats from a diverse panel of experts to include “biohackers”, who represent a different population that experiments with these types of technologies in unexpected ways.

The Internet-of-Medical-Things (IoMT) generates biological information and is transforming healthcare through the introduction of internet-connected medical-grade devices that are integrated with wider-scale health networks to improve patients’ health. Many innovative ideas arise from academia; however, there is a lack of support in medical device regulation. In response to the ongoing changes in the current regulatory framework of the UK, I propose a new secure by design mechanism that can be employed by early career developers earlier in the development process of a product.

Synthetic biology involves redesigning organisms for useful purposes by engineering them to possess new capabilities. This briefing identifies potential crimes that are being or will be enabled by synthetic biology, including cyber-biocrime, and suggests steps that could be taken to prevent (some of) them such as the introduction of a National Centre for Biosecurity and Biosafety and a continuous red-teaming approach to emerging technology.

Today’s healthcare is being transformed by remote patient monitoring that brings internet connectivity to medical devices, allowing them to collect and share data over networks. Ingestible Things or ingestible internet-connected pills promise benefits in making our health ‘smarter’ through smart gut-sensing pills. This briefing identifies potential crimes that will be enabled by the Ingestible Things and suggests security features to prevent them such as Secure by Design principles.

Non-mobile apps and app stores, such as wearables, gaming consoles and smart televisions, are widespread; the security of which can be insufficient against determined hackers. To address this issue, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify recommendations for improving the security of apps available through non-mobile app stores, and to identify issues that may be of relevance to the UK’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)’s work on cyber security in these contexts.

The way science is practiced is changing. Life science is ever more integrated within the cyber-domain as laboratories become “connected” and scientific research is dependent on internet-connected systems, tools and devices. Broader community groups work in the biotechnology space due to declining costs of synthetic biology and more accessible community facilities. The emerging field of Cyber-biosecurity becomes important in the safeguarding of valuable biological information and material.

The UCL Security Science Research and Training (SECReT) Society hosts an online platform for PhD researchers’ insights.

I write about biocrime, but also about my experiences between academia and business for aspiring or current PhD researchers.

A platform for stakeholders in policing and criminal justice to share knowledge, insight and opinion.

I write about the growing problem of bio-crime both in the UK and abroad.

Many construction projects have a planning requirement for a Security Needs Assessment (SNA). I developed an innovative SNA product that helped to change the way that crime risk assessments were provided to property clients; improving the quality and efficiency of output reports.